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During the period 1963 to 1966, Britain fought an undeclared war 
against Indonesia in the jungles of Borneo. The war was over Indonesia's 
political and military effort to destabilize the newly-formed Federation of 
Malaysia with the purpose of annexing Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. As 
expressed by the Indonesian president, Achmed Sukarno, this policy was called 
Konfrontasi, or 'Confrontation.' British and Commonwealth forces fought a 
highly successful campaign against Indonesian incursions into Borneo (East 
Malaysia), Malaya (West Malaysia) and Singapore. Although unknown to the 
public at the time, the British and Commonwealth forces went onto the offensive 
in Borneo from August 1964 until three months before the formal cessation of 
hostilities on 11 August 1966. 
The offensive took the form of top secret, cross-border operations and 
raids code-named CLARET, and proved to be an integral factor in the successful 
conclusion of the military campaign. It would be specious to credit Sukarno's 
fall from power in March 1966 solely to the military failure of Confrontation. 
It is equally specious to ascribe this fall only to domestic reasons.1 Knowledge 
of CLARET helps to bridge the gap between these two schools of thought. 
CLARET was a politico-military tool employed in response as much to political 
situations as it was to military ones. This article will examine in some detail the 
circumstances which made CLARET a necessity, the political nature and extent 
of the operations, and its sensitivity to political changes. 
THE ROOTS OF CONFRONTATION 
Field Marshall The Lord Bramall, who commanded a British battalion 
during the campaign, calls Confrontation "the war that shouldn't have hap-
pened."2 His rationale is that since Malays, Borneans and Indonesians have so 
much in common there was no need for any kind of conflict. Like many others, 
Bramall places the blame for Confrontation squarely on the shoulders of 
President Sukarno of Indonesia.3 Sukarno carried out a policy of confrontation 
not only against the nascent Federation of Malaysia but with all of the polities 
he considered to be "Necolims."4The progression of his policy resulted in an 
eventual cessation of much-needed foreign aid from the United States, alignment 
with the People's Republic of China, withdrawal from the United Nations, run-
away inflation, expansive political turmoil in Indonesia and, of course, Confron-
tation with Malaysia and its allies Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. 
Sukarno's reasons for Confrontation were varied and complex and this 
article is not directly concerned with them. However, a little background is 
necessary to understand how and why CLARET came to be. British commit-
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ment to Malaysia during Confrontation had its roots in the Malayan Emergency 
of 1948-1960. In 1957, during the latter stages of the Emergency, the British 
signed treaties which committed them to the defense of their soon-to-be-
independent colonies of Malaya and Singapore. In 1959, the same was done for 
the protectorate of Brunei. Wishing to assure a racial balance between 
predominantly Chinese Singapore and the Malays of the surrounding colonies, 
and to create a stable polity following independence, Britain initiated a drive to 
federate Singapore with the Malayan states, Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak. The 
British were further committed to the area through their participation in the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which it joined in 1954. And in 
addition to these "compelling moral and political reasons for a British presence," 
there was also pressure from the United States to maintain deployments east of 
Suez.5 Thus, during Confrontation the British government's "strategic gaze was 
firmly fixed outside Europe and especially east of Suez."6 
Defense resources allocated east of Suez did not keep pace with the 
increasingly important commitments to the area. The Sandys Defence White 
Paper of 1957, which was to lead to Britain's increased reliance on a nuclear 
deterrent, resulted in the end of national service and the re-birth of a highly 
professional, but much smaller, regular army. Despite the increased quality of 
the all-volunteer force, it was stretched to its numerical limits during the mid-
1960s, especially by commitments in South Arabia and Borneo. "Of the Army's 
60 battalions, more than 24 were committed to overseas operations, and 20 to the 
Rhine Army."7 There is little wonder, men, that when the Director of Borneo 
Operations (DOBOPS) requested troops and helicopters during the first 24 
months of the campaign, Whitehall found it difficult to comply. There is some 
reason to suspect, therefore, that Sukarno believed the British were unable or 
unwilling (or both) to provide security for the fledgling Federation of Malaysia. 
Plans and announcements for the creation of a federation of Malay states 
with Borneo, Brunei, Singapore and Sabah were made well before Sukarno 
advanced any opposition to the plan. His interest in disrupting Malaysia only 
manifested itself after the Indonesian campaign to oust the Dutch from West 
Man came to a successful conclusion toward the end of 1962. There was little 
coincidence between the end of the one campaign and the beginning of the next, 
both of which were similar in the "Indonesian ambivalence between 'diplomacy 
and struggle' as the twin poles of policy."8 
Sukarno claimed that Malaysia was a neo-colonial dupe of Great Britain. 
Although he was very much an anti-imperialist, there were also elements of 
megalomania in Sukarno's pursuit of 'Maphilindo,' an acronym referring to a 
conglomeration of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia which would, of 
course, be ruled from Jakarta and its president for life, Achmed Sukarno. The 
British-sponsored Federation of Malaysia and a continued British presence 
because of SEATO and other commitments thus posed a threat to Indonesian 
hegemony of the area. 
Besides his revolutionary tenets and his desire for control of the Malay 
and Philippine archipelagos, there was also an element of necessity in pursuing 
an adventurist and confrontational foreign policy which diverted attention from 
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domestic problems within Indonesia. Ironically, it was Sukarno who created the 
economic muddle which Indonesia was to become over the next few years, as 
he associated more closely with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), cut off 
Indonesia from US aid and aligned the country on a 'Jakarta-Peking' axis. 
Sukarno's power was predicated on the need for an external enemy. This 
eventually became his undoing as Confrontation with Malaysia proved a failure. 
Unable to produce results abroad, having alienated his anti-communist generals, 
and with the economy a shambles, Sukarno eventually fell and Confrontation 
ended soon after. 
THE INITIAL BRITISH RESPONSE TO CONFRONTATION 
The Brunei Revolt, which broke out on 8 December 1962 with very little 
warning to the security forces, was aided and abetted by Indonesia, though its 
actual involvement probably did not go beyond the provision of training and 
materiel to the rebels.9 Nonetheless, it marked the beginning of a new policy 
toward the territories to the north of Kalimantan, the Indonesian section of 
Borneo. Even though the main part of the rebel force was defeated in a few 
weeks, remnants of the insurgency remained at large for several months before 
they were finally killed in the jungles around Brunei. During the manhunt which 
followed the revolt, Indonesia began to intensity its political and military attacks 
against Malaysian Borneo. The attacks were perpetrated by guerilla bands 
recruited from Borneo, Malaya and Singapore and leavened with leaders from 
the Indonesian Army (TNI) and Marine Corps (KKO). 
Major General Walter Walker, who was in command of the security 
forces tasked with the mopping-up of the rebels, believed that Indonesia was 
poised to play a much larger military role in Borneo. Indeed, even before Yassin 
Affendi, the military leader of the revolt was killed on 18 May 1963, Indonesia 
had already begun to step up its efforts to foment further uprisings in Borneo. On 
12 April 1963, a party of men attacked the police station near Tebedu in the first 
division of Sarawak. The security forces initially did not know who was 
responsible for the raid, although it was known that at least some of the raiders 
were members of the Qandestine Communist Organization (CCO), an arm of 
the predominantly Chinese Sarawak Communist Party. 
The specter of a repeat of the Malayan Emergency was likely in Walker's 
mind as he planned his response. As he had been a successful brigade 
commander in one of the Emergency ' s last and most effective operations, he was 
well suited to the task at hand. The pillars of his Borneo strategy, drawn from 
his earlier experience in Malaya, were to win the 'hearts and minds' of the 
natives, maintain close liaison with civil and police powers and emphasize 
intelligence gathering.10 
Shortly after the raid on Tebedu, evidence came to light indicating that 
the operation had been conducted by Indonesian soldiers. This obviously 
changed the nature of the threat to Borneo considerably. Walker believed the 
Indonesians' strategy to be the active support of dissidents within Sarawak. A 
report by the recently augmented Special Branch showed the CCO to be bigger 
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and stronger than originally thought earlier in the year. The CCO insurgents, 
who were stationed in Kalimantan and called Indonesian Border Terrorists 
(IBTs) by the security forces, were believed to number about 1,500 at this time. 
They were supported by an unknown number of Indonesian regulars, mostly 
concentrated opposite the First and Second Divisions of Sarawak. They even 
feared at one point that the Sultan of Brunei's bodyguard, the Brunei Regiment, 
might itself become the vanguard of a new insurgency. Walker's warnings to 
General Headquarters, Far Eastern Land Forces (FARELF) were now given 
heed and a few reinforcements were deployed from Singapore and Hong Kong 
to Borneo.11 
A crackdown on the CCO was undertaken, and a surprise operation 
mounted to confiscate all 8,500 licensed guns in Borneo retrieved a full 8,000.12 
No doubt this helped to forestall any planned insurrection, but a significant 
internal threat remained along with a growing external threat in the form of deep 
incursions into Borneo from Kalimantan. The task of thwarting the incursions 
was enormous: there were only five battalions initially available to cover a 
frontier stretching for more than 1,000 miles—a land mass as large as England 
and Scotland. 
Indonesian raids into Borneo continued to increase over the summer of 
1963 while the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdhul Rahman, attempted to 
reach apolitical agreement with Sukarno and the Philippines'President Macapagal 
in Manila. At the same time, in August 1963, a large, uniformed force raided 
deep into the Third Division of Sarawak, near Song, and over a period of days 
were defeated by ambushes of the 2/6 Gurkha Rifles. Prisoners taken by the 
Gurkhas revealed that Indonesian regular army officers and non-commissioned 
officers provided the leadership for the force of IBTs. 
IBTs stepped-up their activity as the date for Malaysia's federation in 
September approached. On 16 September, Sarawak and Sabah became inde-
pendent prior to joining the federation but Brunei opted to remain a British 
protectorate. On 28 September, the Indonesian response to federation was felt 
in the Third Division of Sarawak at the longhouse in Long Jawi where six men 
of the 1/2 Gurkha Rifles, three policemen and 21 Border Scouts were stationed. 
The latter were part of a force of natives recruited, trained, armed and uniformed 
to act as the 'eyes and ears' of the security forces in the longhouses. This small 
party fell victim to a raiding party of approximately 200 Indonesians supported 
by 300 unarmed porters. The Indonesians had been in the longhouse for two 
days before attacking, a fact which later led to a restructuring of the Border 
Scouts. The Gurkhas held out by themselves, the rest were taken prisoner or 
killed. Five of the security forces' men were killed and seven of the Border 
Scouts, who had been taken prisoner by the Indonesians, were murdered. In a 
series of ambushes, the rest of 1/2 Gurkha Rifles were able to kill 33 of the raiders 
and scatter'many more in the jungle, where they presumably died of starvation.13 
This raid had two important results, one of which was that the Indonesian 
murder of the Border Scouts alienated the natives in the border area and 
evaporated what little support the Indonesians had enjoyed up to that point. The 
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other result was that the Border Scouts were taken out of uniform and 
reorganized to stress an intelligence-gathering role. They carried on with their 
normal, peacetime occupations, which for many included cross-border barter 
trade. As such they became an extremely valuable intelligence source for 
CLARET and complemented well the reconnaissance tasks now being conducted 
by the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (22 SAS) in the border areas. 
THE SPECIAL AIR SERVICE IN BORNEO 
The SAS proved to be one of the winning elements of the military 
campaign in Borneo, and was an intrinsic part of later cross-border operations. 
The SAS had been reactivated during the Malayan Emergency, where its long-
range reconnaissance, linguistic, 'hearts and minds' and raiding qualities came 
into their own. The successful conclusion of a short — albeit arduous — 
campaign in Oman (1958-59) further proved the efficacy of the SAS's special 
skills. Because of its experience and training in special operations, signalling, 
medicine and linguistics, the regiment was admirably suited to its assigned tasks 
in Borneo. Troopers generally operated in patrols of four men and lived for 
months at a time in a particular village or longhouse, building a trust with the 
natives, as well as an 'eyes and ears' capability with the locals and Border 
Scouts. The result was that information was passed by the natives to the local 
SAS patrol, who then transmitted it to their squadron headquarters. This 
arrangement meant that the majority of Indonesian incursions were detected 
despite the paucity of troops. Armed with this border intelligence, and with the 
skilful use of a limited number of helicopters, die security forces were able to 
ambush raiders on their return to Kalimantan. 
SAS patrols' familiarity with areas near the border also meant that they 
were in the best position to conduct cross-border reconnaissances when finally 
authorized. Their role in CLARET became reconnoitering enemy bases and 
lines of communication, and then leading raiding or ambush parties to these 
targets. If contact was made when patrolling, the SAS's standing order was to 
'shoot-and-scoot;' that is, to disengage as quickly as possible. 
In die early part of die campaign 22 SAS found themselves stretched 
very thinly indeed. With only one squadron in Borneo initially, and its value 
proven to Walker's satisfaction, measures were taken to train other units in die 
SAS role. The Guards Independent Parachute Company, the Gurkha Independ-
ent Parachute Company and ' C Company, 2nd Battalion tiie Parachute Regi-
ment, were all converted to the SAS role. Eventually SAS squadrons from 
Australia and New Zealand were also deployed in Borneo.14 
By 1964, the investment mat Walker had made in die 'hearts and minds' 
strategy began to pay substantial dividends in intelligence. The people were also 
reassured by the quick and effective response of die security forces to die attack 
at Long Jawi. Once notified of die incursion, die Gurkhas were able to guess 
accurately at die likely withdrawal routes of die raiders and ambush diem all die 
way back to die border using various helicopter landing zones (LZs) and ' roping 
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areas' which had been cut at 1,000 yard intervals along the frontier for that very 
purpose. 
THE INDONESIAN INCURSIONS INCREASE 
In December 1963 two more large incursions occurred, one on the 
western end of Sarawak and the other in Sabah at Kalabakan. Men from the 3rd 
Battalion, Royal Malaysian Regiment, who had been sent to Borneo (now 
known as East Malaysia) following federation in September were stationed at 
Kalabakan. Because of poor security, one of their company positions was 
successfully assaulted by Indonesians. Although they fought back coura-
geously, they lost heavily in the first burst of fire. The raiding party did not 
escape, however, and over the next few days more than two-thirds of then-
number — who turned out to be Indonesian marines (KKO) — were killed or 
captured by the security forces.15 Although it was an embarrassing defeat for the 
Malaysians, the extent of the damage was down-played to keep Malaysian 
dignity intact; Malaysians now felt fully involved in the military side of 
Confrontation.16 Even so, 1963 ended with the Indonesians holding the initia-
tive, as they could still cross the border when and where they pleased. 
In January 1964 troops from the Royal Leicestershire Regiment operat-
ing in the Fifth Division of Sarawak discovered a recently vacated camp set up 
for 500 men. Following the tracks from the camp, a section of Leicesters came 
upon another camp with 60 men still in it. They immediately attacked, killing 
several of the enemy and putting the rest to flight.17 Other Indonesian activity of 
the period included Indonesian P-Sl Mustangs and B-2S Mitchells 'buzzing' 
towns in Sarawak, and a thwarted attack on Kuching, the capital of Sarawak. On 
the political front, Sukarno announced a 'cease fire' in January, which was 
followed by a United Nations mission of enquiry to Borneo to see if the people 
of Sarawak and Sabah had really wanted to join the Federation of Malaysia. The 
mission concluded that they did, but Sukarno rejected its findings, even though 
the mission had been at his insistence. 
In response to the inimicable findings of the UN mission, the Indone-
sians increased their military activity and dramatically altered their tactics. 
Between March and May 1964, Indonesian agents or sympathizers set off 13 
explosions in Singapore. On 6 March, men from the 2/10 Gurkha Rifles 
encountered elements of the 328 Raider Battalion, an Indonesian regular army 
unit On the 31 st of the same month, the 2/10 Gurkhas fought with a strong force 
from die 'Black Cobra Battalion,' another regular unit. Both episodes turned 
into fierce fire-fights, unlike previous encounters with JJBTs. In the latter case, 
SS-11 wire-guided missiles fired from helicopters were used to extricate the 
Indonesians from caves.18 The Indonesians were now employing their best 
regular infantry, marines and paratroops as attacking units, mostly in company 
size, sometimes larger.19 For the British forces, the conflict had changed from 
a platoon commander's war to a company commander's war, as evidenced by 




In May, Sukarno increased the bellicosity of his words when, in a speech 
on National Resurrection Day, he summoned a nation-wide mobilization of 
"volunteers to fight Malaysia." In June another attempt to solve the conflict by 
diplomatic means failed in Tokyo, whereupon Sukarno then vowed to "crush 
Malaysia" by "cock-crow on the 1st of January 1965."20 His words were fol-
lowed by actions which, over the next few months, seriously escalated the 
conflict, threatened open war, and eventually resulted in a new British strategy 
to respond to the growing threat. 
At about the same time that the Tokyo talks broke down, a large 
Indonesian force attacked a bivouacked patrol of the 1/6 Gurkha Rifles near 
Rasau, in the First Division. The Indonesians began "choosing known bases and 
helicopter LZs as their targets," signalling that they had changed their tactics.21 
In early July intelligence sources indicated that the Indonesians were sending 
reinforcements to those areas in Kalimantan that fronted the First Division. On 
the other end of the frontier in the Tawau area of Sabah, a growing number of 
marine commandos were seen, amphibious landing exercises were reported, and 
the Indonesians tried to jam the security forces' wireless communications. CCO 
and Indonesian agents became more active in East and West Malaysia, but 
external acts of aggression dropped over all during July and early August.22 
Walker believed that major enemy activity was imminent. He was 
proven correct when, on 17 August, a combined force of guerrillas and 
Indonesian marines made a seaborne landing on the Johore coast of Malaya 
(West Malaysia). Its objective was to link up with Chinese communists and 
other sympathizers, and begin a revolution. The Indonesians' assessment of the 
political situation in Malaya proved to be wildly inaccurate, as the local people 
actually helped the security forces to round up the insurgents. Nonetheless, the 
action could only be seen as a further escalation of Confrontation. The seaborne 
landing was followed by an airborne landing on 2 September, which was also 
successfully thwarted. On 4 September, violent race riots broke out, incited by 
Indonesian agent provocateurs?3 
CLARET 
Most published sources that mention CLARET are ambiguous about 
when cross-border operations were first authorized. This is understandable 
since the most explicit sources are regimental histories which deal almost 
exclusively with die activity of a particular battalion's tour in Borneo. In 
Fighting General, Tom Pocock indicates that CLARET was not authorized until 
August 1964, after the first Indonesian incursion into West Malaysia. Pocock 
tied authorization for CLARET to a visit to Borneo by Fred Mulley, the Deputy 
Secretary of State for Defence and Army Minister in the summer of 1964. 
Walker supposedly convinced Mulley of the need for cross-border raids to keep 
the Indonesians off-balance. Mulley reportedly agreed with Walker, promising 
to pass on this information to Denis Healey, who had recently become Secretary 
of State for Defence. Presumably, Healey then raised the matter before the full 
Cabinet, which gave its assent based on the growing threat indicated by the 
seaborne landing and the Indonesian buildup opposite the First Division.24 
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However, in works published since Fighting General, evidence is given 
that SAS and Gurkha troops were operating across the border before August 
1964, perhaps as early as May or June.25 In an article published in Australian 
Outlook, David Horner cites a cable sent in April 1964 from the then British 
Prime Minister, Sir Douglas Alec-Home, to the Australian Prime Minister, Sir 
Robert Menzies, informing the latter that "British and Malaysian security forces 
in Borneo were to be permitted to cross the Indonesian border in hot pursuit for 
a distance of up to 3,000 yards."26 No doubt this authorization had been given 
in light of the presence of Indonesian regular units inside Borneo in March 1964. 
Clarification of the seeming contradiction betweenPocock'sand Dickens' 
version on the one hand, and Horner's on the other, comes from Major General 
R.W.L. McAlister, who tells of one company of the 2/10 Gurkha Rifles which 
was held as battalion reserve for 'special operations.' "Special operations was 
the [term] initially used to denote 'cross border' operations (later given the 
codeword CLARET). Great secrecy surrounded these operations; only the CO 
and one selected company per battalion were, at this time [c. July 1964], to be 
fully aware of special operations planning and execution."27 The 'special op-
erations ' men may have been responsible for the relative lull in border incursions 
in July and August, as the ability to cross the border in 'hot pursuit,' combined 
with the extremely effective use of helicopters to move blocking forces rapidly 
made deep penetrations less and less likely to succeed. Indonesian activity 
before the seaborne landings in Malaya had been mostly confined to "brief night 
raids or ambushes close to the border, mainly to support their claims that they 
were responding to requests for assistance from the local population."28 
CLARET was part of a new strategy designed to stop Indonesian 
incursions by forcing mem onto the defensive. Policy-makers deemed that on 
no account was the public to know of this change in strategy, and so CLARET 
was conducted with the utmost secrecy. The nature of the first CLARET 
operations, which began in August 1964, were not at first recognized by the 
Indonesians for what they were, but rather were seen, quite possibly, as 
"extensions of routine ambushing carried out a mile or two farther south" of a 
very ill-defined border. "It is doubtful whether the Indonesians realized they 
were seeing the beginning of a new Commonwealth strategy," as their staff 
structure and communications were relatively poor and unable to construe any 
coherence to the activity.29 
Cross-border raids of an offensive nature was the true purpose of 
CLARET. 'Hot-pursuit'does not fall into that category. Raids on enemy targets 
inside Kalimantan appear not to have started until after the seaborne landing of 
17 August; but the SAS, and perhaps the 'special operations' companies, had 
already been conducting reconnaissances of possible targets throughout the 
spring and summer of 1964. When the Indonesian landings in Malaya occurred, 
the security forces were able to conduct appropriate retaliatory raids almost 
immediately. Even so, the pace of operations was relatively slow throughout the 
autumn and winter of 1964-65, as Walker insisted on thorough reconnaissance 
and planning before he would even consider a raid. Even men the Director of 
Operations confined CLARET raids to a stringent set of restrictions which he 
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drew up in order to ensure secrecy and effectiveness. Known as the 'Golden 
Rules,' they were: 
— Every operation will be authorized by DOBOPS. 
— Only trained and tested troops will be used. 
— Depth of penetration must be limited and the attacks must 
only be made to thwart offensive action by the enemy. 
— No air support will be given to any operation across the 
border, except in the most extreme of emergencies. 
— Every operation must be planned with the aid of a sand table 
and thoroughly rehearsed for at least two weeks. 
— Each operation will be planned and executed with maximum 
security. Every man taking part must be sworn to secrecy, full 
cover plans must be made and the operations to be given 
code-names and never discussed in detail on telephone or 
radio. Identity discs must be left behind before departure and 
no traces — such as cartridge cases, paper, ration packs, etc. 
— must be left in Kalimantan. 
— On no account must any soldier taking part be captured by the 
enemy — alive or dead.30 
The Golden Rules were faithfully followed. Available sources indicate 
that operations followed months of reconnoitering, planning and rehearsing 
every possible detail, including fields of fire for machine-guns, silent plotting 
for artillery and mortar fire, approach routes, etc. The degree to which all cross-
border operations were subject to high-level review and approval was remarkable. 
"Reconnaissance patrols were to be decided by the brigade commander, who 
would notify [the division commander], but other cross-border operations were 
to be determined by the Director of Borneo Operations on the basis of recom-
mendations from [the division commander] and his brigade commanders, on 
SAS advice, and on intelligence available."31 
Since no soldiers, alive or dead, were to be left behind, casualties during 
CLARET operations could pose a real problem. Fortunately for the security 
forces there were very few. Bodies of any dead or wounded had to be carried 
back to the border before being evacuated by helicopter. Only one instance of 
a helicopter 'casevac' (casualty evacuation) from Kalimantan is recorded. 
There are at least two cases of soldiers being lost across the border, but in neither 
case is there any indication that the Indonesians ever found the bodies. Walker 
attributes the success of operations and the minimal number of casualties to his 
insistence on training.32 
One of the first CLARET strikes was carried out in August 1964 by the 
1/2 Gurkha Rifles, who were stationed in the Fifth Division of Sarawak and 
western Sabah. Opposite their battalion front, only a few thousand yards into 
Kalimantan, was an enemy post near Nantakor. After a reconnaissance carried 
out by the SAS had revealed that the post was held by troops of the S18 Battalion, 
the Gurkhas began planning and rehearsing for a raid on the unsuspecting 
enemy. In early September General Walker approved the plan for the operation. 
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The raid was successfully executed: the Gurkhas pushed the enemy completely 
out of their camp, which was searched and then burned.33 
Throughout the autumn of 1964, security forces, consisting mostly of 
SAS and Gurkhas, began to strike at the enemy in their once inviolate bases near 
the border. But military and political activity outside Borneo threatened to 
escalate the conflict. The revelation that the British had drawn up plans to 
destroy the Indonesian navy and air force following the airborne landing in 
September and another seaborne landing in October, made all-out war more 
likely. Due to increasing isolation in the United Nations because of Malaysian 
complaints about Indonesian aggression, Sukarno moved in November and 
December toward a closer alignment with Communist China, which only a 
month earlier had exploded its first nuclear bomb (20 kilotons). The Austral-
ians ' increasing concern over a possible Indonesian threat to Papua New Guinea 
led to the dispatch of Australian troops to Borneo and the institution of a form 
of selective service.34 In January 1965 Sukarno pulled Indonesia out of the UN 
and aligned himself with the People's Republic of China. 
The British government believed the sea and air strikes would unnec-
essarily escalate the conflict and so ruled them out. To stop a possible invasion 
of Borneo, the government instead authorized Walker to increase the depth of 
CLARET operations to 5,000 yards, eventually increasing it to 10,000 yards as 
a further response to the Indonesian threat toward the end of the year.33 By the 
end of 1964, Indonesia had massed a growing number of its best troops opposite 
the First Division of Sarawak while the KKO marines in the Tawau area, and on 
Sebatik Island—through which the international border ran—were increased 
to a full brigade, virtually trebling the Indonesian strength along the border.36 
With 12,000 Indonesian troops already in border garrisons, British 
intelligence predicted that by February of 1965, mere would be well over 22,000 
soldiers in about 50 regular companies and 20 irregular companies along the 
border. The build-up was carried out concurrently with a restructuring of the 
Indonesian command system by General Maraden Panggabean, who regrouped 
those units ranged against Borneo into the 'Number 4 Combat Command, ' with 
Col. Supargo as its director of operations.37 Study of enemy activity during this 
period revealed a "steadily rising graph of border violations north and south of 
Biawak," which was on the road leading to the capital of Sarawak, Kuching.38 
Company-sized actions were taking place on both sides of the First Division 
border, which Walker claimed reached the same level of ferocity as the war in 
Burma against the Japanese.39Reports worried Walker that the Indonesians' 
main parachute force was being held in readiness. With most of the activity 
taking place opposite the First Division, Walker feared that the Indonesians 
might be planning a general assault with Kuching as its final objective.40 
Despite the increasing operational depth of raids, CLARET operations 
still remained few in number. Walker insisted that only troops who had 
completed at least one tour could take part, meaning that few, if any, of the 
recently arrived reinforcements were eligible. The careful and repeated re-
connaissance and planning needed also kept the number of operations low. So 
too did Walker's rationale for CLARET raids: the Director of Operations saw 
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CLARET only as a deterrent measure, so mat when he was given authorization 
in January 1965 to increase the depth of operations up to 10,000 yards, he 
allowed raids "not as a pre-emptive offensive nor even with the expectation of 
causing serious disruption, but as psychological rapier-thrusts to make Supargo 
think defensively and take his mind off other things [i.e., an offensive into the 
First Division]."41 
Walker's CLARET strategy was part of an evolving British counter-
insurgency doctrine. According to Tom Mockaitis, this doctrine was an 
outgrowth of 'imperial policing' between the wars and of the campaigns in 
Palestine, Malaya, Cyprus and Kenya and was based on three broad principles: 
"minimum force, civil-military cooperation, and tactical flexibility."42 Conse-
quently, Walker would sometimes relax the pressure on the Indonesians when 
he deemed that the enemy casualties were too high.43 
As the winter monsoons approached, Gurkha battalions remained very 
much on the offensive against the Indonesians. The 2/2 Gurkha Rifles in 
particular enjoyed a series of successes against the Indonesians opposite them 
in the Second Division, although there was only one major assault on an enemy 
camp, in October. That action had been a 'fire assault' with machine-guns on 
the enemy camp near Jambu. The original idea for the raid had been turned down 
by Walker on "political grounds," but the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Neill, 
persisted and was eventually given the green light.44 Many of the security forces' 
actions were fairly small in this period, however, as most cross-border activity 
seems to have been confined to reconnaissance patrols.45 
At the beginning of 1965, Sukarno moved closer to Communist China 
and the threat to the First Division increased. To blunt this, several carefully 
planned and rehearsed major CLARET operations were ordered. In January, the 
2/10 Gurkha Rifles near the north end of the First Division carried out a close 
reconnaissance of the enemy post at Sadjingan, a village of less than 100 Dyak 
tribesmen which lay 5,000 yards west of Biawak. The British Intelligence NCO 
in Biawak, with information from his Border Scout interpreter, traders and paid 
agents, found that 50 men of the TNF s 428 Raider Battalion were stationed in 
the village. Fortunately, the soldiers lived in a separate hut from the Dyaks and 
so presented an easy target for an assault and supporting ambushes. The 
successful raid eventually resulted in a temporary cessation of Indonesian use 
of the Koemba River as a resupply route.46 
In early 1964, an Indonesian force built a military base at Long Medan 
opposite the Fifth Division, and sealed up an old trade route for buffalo and salt. 
This action disconcerted natives on both sides of the border, but they were 
powerless to prevent it. The locals appealed to the commander of C Company, 
1/2 Gurkha Rifles, to help them. Capt. Jackman, OC *C Company, wanted to 
assist: enemy troops from Long Medan had fired rockets and mortars toward his 
base in October and he wanted to hit them back. He pinpointed the enemy 
position at Long Medan through various reconnaissances and other intelligence. 
Jackman then asked the Battalion CO for permission to launch an attack against 
Long Medan. "Soon I was visited by the Brigade Commander, Brig. Gen. Harry 
Tuzo... then by [Walker] and finally by the C-in-C himself," related Jackman. 
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"Each commander asked for more information about the enemy, which meant 
each visit heralded a trip across the border to have another look at the camp." 
One reconnaissance in January 1965 even involved taking a movie film of the 
objective. A careful plan was drawn up and by the end of January the attacking 
force of 148 Gurkhas crossed the border. One part of the force assaulted the 
actual camp while the other elements ambushed likely routes of reinforcement 
and provided supporting fire for the assault team. Later intelligence confirmed 
that 50% of the Indonesian garrison had been killed in the action and the area 
abandoned by the survivors. The villagers were extremely grateful, as they 
could at last return to their buffalo and salt trade. And, "although the Indonesians 
continued to operate along that strip of the border until the end of Confrontation, 
not once did they set foot over it again, nor did they re-occupy Long Medan."47 
Despite such successes, the Indonesians opposite the First Division were 
not deterred by CLARET. They were taking losses, however, and some of their 
lines of communication were becoming insecure, especially river-borne traffic. 
That Borneo had become a major theater of operations was demonstrated by the 
visit of the Chief of the Defence Staff, Lord Mountbatten, and the Government's 
Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Solly Zuckerman, in February. The visit had two 
major results, the first being a change in "attitudes to the Borneo campaign... 
in London. At last it was no longer an embarrassing military sideshow but a . . . 
conflict of the utmost importance."48 The British believed the 'Jakarta-Peking' 
axis could prove to be a major threat, especially as events were heating up in 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. 
The second result was a new priority in supplying equipment to the 
forces in Borneo. Whereas Walker had been deprived of much of what he 
needed before the visit — he had been accused of over-stating the threat—he 
now got more (but not all) of what he needed.49 In particular, weapons such as 
the US 'Claymore' anti-personnel mine, the M-79 grenade launcher, seismic 
intruder device and Armalite carbine (AR-15) were added to the firepower of the 
security forces in Borneo. Better rations and the introduction of lightweight rain 
gear from Australia also improved the soldier's lot, so that when the tempo of 
Confrontation increased in mid-1965, the security forces were much better 
equipped to carry out offensive operations.50 These were fortunate and timely 
changes as the long-awaited enemy offensive into the First Division was about 
to begin. 
THE INTENSIVE PHASE 
On 12 March 1965 Major General George Lea took over from Walker 
as Director of Borneo Operations. Lea inherited a "miniature army, navy and 
air force complete in all its arms and appendages from the infantry soldiers on 
the frontier to organizations for pay, welfare and public relations in the rear;" in 
all, a force numbering some 20,000 men.51 The force had grown considerably 
since 1964 in response to the Indonesian build-up, and the arrival of several more 
British and Malaysian battalions during the six month period prior to Lea's 
arrival necessitated a slight change in the command structure of the security 
forces. Where there had been only a few battalions stretched over the frontier 
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divided into three brigades, the all-important First Division of Sarawak was now 
given its own brigade when reinforcements arrived and the troops were less 
thinly spread (see Order of Battle). 
Lea, like Walker, expected the Indonesians to mount a major operation 
of some sort, else they would not have amassed a strong force of their best troops 
opposite the First Division. He needed time to take stock of the situation and to 
consider what should be done with CLARET. "In the meantime [the enemy] was 
not being hit at all, which would surely encourage him to further aggression."52 
Lea ordered a slight increase in the tempo of CLARET activity by allowing the 
SAS to take offensive action during the last two days of their reconnaissance 
patrols — but only against targets which "offered a realistic chance of suc-
cess."53 It became apparent six weeks after Lea became DOBOPS that CLARET 
was not a completely effective deterrent. 
Towards the end of March 1965, the 1st Battalion, the Argyll & 
Sutherland Highlanders handed over their sector of the southern part of the First 
Division to the 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment. The Argylls had had a 
busy tour as there had been numerous and fairly large Indonesian incursions, 
often of company size. Within days of the changeover, 2 Para was meeting the 
enemy all over its battalion area and discovered Indonesian activity throughout 
March and April indicating that the Indonesians were planning an attack on the 
'B' Company position at Plaman Mapu.54 
It was evident to the operations staff of the 17th Gurkha Division 
headquartered on Labuan Island that something major was planned. Their 
intelligence had shown that an Indonesian engineer battalion was operating near 
the frontier and was improving routes up to the border, and that amongst the 
many Indonesian units opposite the First Division, there was a battalion of 
Indonesian paratroopers (RPKAD) near the southern end of the division. 
At 0505 hours on a "very dark, wet, rainy night," two companies of 
Indonesian paratroopers, with a third company in reserve, attacked the 'B' 
Company base at Plaman Mapu. Unlike previous attacks, this one avoided the 
longhouse and went straight for the company base which was lightly held by a 
weak platoon of "cooks and bottle-washers."55 The RPKAD had some initial 
success in hitting a mortar and machine-gun, but the British paratroopers 
quickly recovered and fought off their attackers, inflicting heavy casualties.56 
The enemy had attempted to overrun a company base, and by so doing 
had signalled that they had decided to raise the stakes in Confrontation. The 
Indonesians were still full of fight after Plaman Mapu and their activity remained 
at a high level throughout May, with 2 Para fighting off a major incursion against 
Mongkus late in the month. The tactical situation was intolerable to Lea and he 
felt that the Indonesians should be forced to stay well away from the border. But 
how? 
The ideal target was undoubtedly an enemy force before it 
struck, but since such forces were assembled in the rear areas and 
spent the minimum time near the border [the security forces 
would] be lucky to get timely enough warning. Additional 
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targets must be selected, die most promising being routine 
enemy movements on tracks or rivers whenever Intelligence 
indicated and topography suited, so Lea's policy became die art 
of die possible.57 
If Lea needed another indication that the Indonesians had escalated 
Confrontation, he got it on 26 June when a combined force of TNI and Ü3T 
troops managed to penetrate into the heart of the First Division and attack several 
civilian targets near the 18th Milestone Police Station on the main track through 
the area. Besides killing several policemen, the raiders deliberately killed men, 
women and children from loyal ethnic Chinese families in the area, apparently 
in an attempt to terrorize and intimidate mem into helping me CCO. In reaction 
to me raid on the police station, Lea ordered many of the ethnic Chinese in the 
area to be rounded-up and resettled in order to protect them and cut off CCO 
sympathizers from die CCO and IBTs.58 
Lea's response to Indonesian actions was to authorize an "intensified 
series of CLARET strikes to make absolutely clear to the Indonesians mat their 
proper place was behind meir own frontier."59 When the 2/10 Gurkha Rifles 
arrived at Bau in July 1965 for meir mird tour, diey were "ordered to step up me 
offensive action and seek entirely to eliminate the current threat to Sarawak by 
dominating me area up to 5,000 yards over the border, to the extent mat the 
enemy's forward bases became untenable, and to follow mis up by further 
forcing the Indonesians to retreat to the 10,000 yard line from where meaningful 
incursions simply could not be mounted."60 The 2/10 Gurkhas' first major op-
erations were not to begin until August, as there was to be no skimping on 
reconnaissance, planning or training. Failure was unacceptable for the same 
reasons it had been when CLARET first began almost a year earlier61 : die British 
did not want it known mat mey were operating in Kalimantan. Heavy losses for 
either side would be hard to keep secret for long. 
The 2/10 Gurkha Rifles began meir effort to create a 10,000 yard cordon 
sanitaire in August widi Operation SUPER SHELL, a multi-company operation 
involving two assaults simultaneously. While one part of the force overran an 
Indonesian camp with an infantry assault, the other part of the force conducted 
a fire assault against the first camp's support base further down river. The result 
was mat the Indonesians ceased to use the Koemba River as a supply route, and 
were forced instead to cut an overland track. This too was discovered by the 
Gurkhas, but an ambush was not at first authorized because of the numerous 
successes being scored by security forces up and down me border of me First 
Division. 
Lea wanted to maintain pressure on the Indonesians, but it was to be a 
steady pressure. The ambush of die track was eventually authorized by West 
Brigade's commander, Brigadier Cheyne, in late September. The ambush, 
conducted shortly after its authorization, was code-named Operation HIGH 
HURDLE. This too was a success as the enemy abandoned another of his base 
areas and fell back to a river line some distance back, "thus surrendering 10,000 
yards of border jungle to Gurkha patrols."62 
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Other battalions on CLARET operations scored similar successes. The 
1/2 Royal Green Jackets (King's Royal Rifle Corps), commanded by Lt. Col. E. 
D. B ramall, conducted two major raids in August. Early in the month, 'A' and 
' C Companies attacked a large enemy camp at Kepala Pasang. "This particular 
group of enemy never again showed any offensive inclination at all... from then 
on concentrating] exclusively on their own defence, later abandoning the 
camp."63 Another ' C Company attack, this time on an enemy camp in Mankau, 
had virtually the same effect as the previous attack. The camp was not destroyed 
but the enemy suffered many casualties and pressure on it was stepped up by 
ambushing the lines of communication with its battalion and flank companies. 
"Intelligence soon revealed that Mankau, the main enemy camp on [1/2 Royal 
Green Jackets'] front, had also turned on the defensive."64 
The 2/2 Gurkha Rifles, whose previous tour had seen many CLARET 
successes, was also quite active in this period. They launched a two-company 
ambush of a river, which was used extensively by the Indonesians, killing 27 of 
the enemy in just the one operation.65 "In the meantime, no track or river was safe 
from the risk of such casualties."66 It was clear that such river ambushes, small 
though they may have been, hurt much more than the loss may have indicated. 
"The main Indonesian supply line [i.e., rivers] suddenly became insecure and in 
need of urgent, widespread and unwelcome troop redeployment to guard it," 
admitted one Indonesian officer. The overall result of this series of intensified 
CLARET operations was that "Mongkus was the enemy's last major incursion 
into the First Division in 1965."67 In July and August alone, West Brigade had 
killed nearly 300 of the enemy, almost all during CLARET operations.68 Indeed, 
CLARET was succeeding so well that 
.. . at least one Indonesian local commander sent a runner across 
the border to his opposite number informing him that he was 
withdrawing some fifteen kilometres back: 'We got a message 
saying, "I will not disturb you. I've withdrawn back to this 
village. I'm carrying out no more offensive operations against 
you. Please leave me alone.'"69 
Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the domestic situation was rapidly deteriorat-
ing. Sukarno's vow to crush Malaysia by the beginning of 1965 had not come 
to pass and his wooing of the Communist Party of Indonesia, the PKI, was 
increasing along with his closer ties to the People's Republic of China. 
Confrontation was not succeeding as had the campaign against the Dutch in 
West Irian. Despite the cost of the war and a growing sterling crisis in London, 
the British continued to persevere in their defense of Malaysia, much to 
Sukarno's surprise. In response to Indonesia's pursuit of Confrontation and 
closer ties with Communist China, the United States cut off much-needed 
financial aid, which by the end of the summer was causing unprecedented 
inflation and the country teetered on economic collapse.70 A failed coup attempt 
by the PKI on 30 September set off a series of events which eventually 
culminated in the end of Confrontation. In the weeks that followed the coup 
attempt, chaos reigned as the Indonesian Army, mostly headed by anti-com-
munists, tried to regain control. With more pressing problems at home, the army 
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chiefs shifted their attention from the campaign in Borneo and began then-
bloody efforts to eradicate the PKI. 
Political and diplomatic signals from Indonesia at this time were 
confused and British evaluation took a long time. Lea decided to call a 
temporary halt to CLARET and assumed a wait-and-see attitude with regard to 
developments in Jakarta. This respite, known to the SAS as a 'be kind to Lidos' 
period, was terminated in November, when die Indonesians sent an incursion 
force into the Katibas Basin of the Third Division. "Whether that conformed to 
General Suharto's policy or stemmed rather from local enthusiasm, General Lea 
took no chances and let slip the dogs of war."71 On the Kalimantan side of the 
border, the British and Gurkha troops fought several fierce actions, the SAS even 
launching an unprecedented, full-squadron attack.72 The 2/2 Gurkha Rifles 
conducted four operations, two of which were multi-company ambushes of 
enemy river and land lines of communications.73 The 2/10 Gurkha Rifles, not to 
be outdone, carried out two major operations, both against troops of the 'J' 
Battalion of the Diponogoro Division. Operation TIME KEEPER was an attack 
on an enemy garrison located on top of Gunong Tepoi, a strongly defended 
complex sited for mutual support with other garrisons and covered by artillery 
and mortar support. In this deployment the 2/10 Gurkha Rifles were able to carry 
the position, hold it against enemy counter-attacks with the help of S.5 inch and 
105mm artillery-fire, then withdraw in good order 4,000 yards to the border.74 
The First Division remained the main area of operations for both the 
British and die Indonesians but mere was still activity toward the eastern end of 
the frontier. In the area where Sarawak and Sabah join, the 1/2 Gurkha Rifles 
had a busy time while they tried to dominate the enemy's side of the border. 
Throughout the second half of 1965 and into January 1966, the battalion 
continued to prevail over the enemy in the valley between Long Bawan and 
Long Medan following the raid on the latter target. In a series of minor actions, 
the Gurkhas each time out-maneuvered the Indonesians. Although each 
operation only gained limited tactical success, the combination of these raids 
produced a strategic pressure which forced the Indonesians to withdraw from all 
of their forward positions — some 17 camps or posts—mainly because of the 
risk of ambushes or direct hits from thé one 105mm gun supporting the 1/2 
Gurkha Rifles. "By the end of 1965, the Indonesians had withdrawn some 
10,000 yards, and the Gurkhas followed them up, maintaining contact and 
observation. During this period every rifleman in ' C Company spent at least 
half of his time actually living in Kalimantan."75 
ON-AGAIN, OFF-AGAIN 
By the end of November, at least 120 Indonesians had been killed by 
troops of West Brigade during the renewed CLARET operations, while the 
security forces had lost only one killed. Lea wanted as little killing as possible 
given the political situation in Indonesia, where, beginning in December, 
wholesale slaughter of communists and others was carried out by the Indonesian 
army. So, although he was unsure if he was making the right decision, Lea 
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ordered another 'be kind to Indos' break.76 Even though December was rela-
tively uneventful in terms of activity by Indonesian regulars, some IBT activity 
did occur. Lea "drew a clear distinction between [the regulars and the communist 
IBTs]"77 noting that the IBTs would never give up, even when Confrontation 
ended, because life for the communists in Indonesia had become decidedly 
unhealthy. The Indonesian army, on the other hand, had no such problem and 
presumably would give up when ordered.78 But the Indonesians once again 
changed their tactics. 
January 1966 was another quiet month as no major raids crossed the 
border in either direction. But the SAS and similar units continued to patrol in 
Kalimantan to "check that the enemy was as quiescent as he seemed."79 Towards 
die end of the month, British intelligence warned of an imminent attack from 
Sentas, across the border from Tebedu. "Brigadier Cheyne was for once able to 
order a pre-emptive strike in the manner originally envisioned for all CLARET 
operations."80 An attack was mounted but was only partially successful, as the 
expected incursion was made the following month from an enemy camp further 
down river. 
The force comprised approximately 70 men, mostly RPKAD, the rest, 
about 20, being Chinese IBTs. It was remarkable that the raiders penetrated as 
far as they did given that the security forces had managed for the most part to 
establish their cordon sanitaire of 10,000 yards. Involvement by the CCO was 
the key to their success since they had local contacts who knew the area well. 
The raiders almost reached Serian before being discovered and men were 
gradually eliminated over a period of several weeks.81 
In response to the enemy's action, Lea again ordered offensive raids to 
be carried out. In the Bau and Serian areas of the First Division, the l/10Gurkha 
Rifles had the task of moving back across the border. During January, cross-
border action in the area by 42 Commando, Royal Marines, and its attached 
company of 2/10 Gurkha Rifles, was restricted for political reasons. When the 
1st Battalion became fully operational on 8 February, it sent two companies 
across the border for ten days of reconnaissances-in-strength to see if the 
Indonesians had used the lull to creep forward again and discovered that they 
had. Along the Koemba river, the enemy were once again moving men and 
supplies to their camps in and around Silaus as they had done before 2/2 Gurkha 
Rifles had made the river insecure. With some months' respite, due to the 
political constraints placed on CLARET, as well as the change-over of battal-
ions, once again diesel-engined craft, landing craft and longboats plied the 
Koemba.82 
The 1/10 Gurkha Rifles received authorization to ambush the Koemba 
following the Indonesian incursion of 16 February. Toward the end of that 
month, they laid a two-company ambush along the river and its approaches and 
their patience was rewarded by the substantial target of a diesel-engined craft. 
The ambush was kept in place for the rest of the day and they hit two more boats 
which were on their way to find out what the firing was about. In mis one action 
the Gurkhas accounted for at least 37 killed before mey withdrew to their side 
of the border. Although artillery sound-ranging devices and further patrols 
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revealed that another stretch of the Koemba was still being used for troop and 
materiel movement, political developments "now precluded further ambush-
ing."83 Indeed, elements of the battalion had just completed an extremely close 
reconnaissance of the enemy base at Kindau which indicated that a new regular 
division had arrived in the area. The whole battalion was in Kalimantan on 25 
March and four of its five companies were in the process of surrounding the base 
when they received word to break off the assault. All they were allowed to do 
before retreating to the border was to launch a fire assault by supporting 
artillery.84 
In late March 1966, secret 'peace feelers' were sent to Kuala Lumpur. 
Even though incursions by IBTs continued throughout the peace negotiations, 
Lea did not feel the need to authorize new CLARET raids. Reconnaissance 
activity in Kalimantan to give the security forces warning of possible attacks 
continued, to be sure,85 but the secret war between the Commonwealth and 
Indonesian regulars now drew to a close. Confrontation continued, but more in 
the form in which it began: incursions by IBTs with a leavening of Indonesian 
regulars, who were then hunted down and eliminated. A face-to-face meeting 
between Indonesian officers representing General Suharto and members of the 
Malaysian government occurred on 25 May 1966, and three days later all cross-
border activity by the security forces ended. CLARET came to a close three 
months before a formal cessation of Confrontation was ratified on 11 August.86 
CLARET: AN APPRAISAL 
In the limited and politicized wars fought since 1945, even tactical 
decisions could have a strategic or political effect. The Borneo campaign was a 
good example of the "need for close and continuous control of military 
operations in the light of... political implications."87 The decision to authorize 
cross-border raids was made at the highest levels of the British government, 
which was subsequently able to turn CLARET off and on like a faucet, 
depending on the political situation.88 There seems to have been a direct cor-
relation between Indonesian politico-military action and the intensity of CLARET 
activity, the best example of which was the 10th Gurkha Rifles' CLARET raid 
of March 1966. In response to secret peace-feelers, the battalion-sized raid was 
halted in mid-operation. 
The British and Malaysians wished to avoid any unnecessary escalation 
of Confrontation for a number of reasons. Because Britain, Malaysia and 
Australia were able to demonstrate to the rest of the world that Indonesia was 
clearly the aggressor in Confrontation, Indonesia's virtual isolation was assured. 
It is doubtful, however, whether this feat of diplomacy could have been achieved 
if cross-border raids had been made public, regardless of Malaysia's right to 
protect herself in such a manner. There was also the possibility that should 
operations become a matter of public scrutiny, then their very success could 
have hampered de-escalation of the conflict, since Indonesian prestige would 
have been on the line. As events transpired, Indonesia was able to disengage 




But how exactly did CLARET contribute to the ending of Confronta-
tion? It may have increased the division between Sukarno and the army officers 
who played such a key role in his overthrow. Sukarno possibly never knew about 
British activity in Kalimantan (i.e., CLARET), or that by August 1965 his 
soldiers were no longer operating in East Malaysia.89 The heads of the army 
would not have been keen to expose their military failings to Sukarno. The fact 
that CLARET operations were almost always successful in tactical terms, that 
they were in nearly every case completely deniable by the security forces, and 
that virtually fool-proof covers were invented for every operation, all perpetuated 
the myth that the war was still being fought on the Malaysian side of the border. 
The Indonesian army generals were not willing to disturb this fabrication as it 
made them out to be more successful than they really were. There is reason to 
believe, therefore, that lack of success by the Indonesian army was viewed as 
'foot-dragging' by its political opponents, especially the PKI, which in turn may 
have expanded the rift between Sukarno and Suharto and forced the latter to act 
in the aftermath of the attempted coup.90 
Secrecy was one of the keys to CLARET's successful contribution to 
ending Confrontation. The ability to keep CLARET a secret may have been a 
situation unique to Borneo. The frontier was in most cases accessible only by 
helicopter or small boat and the military was able to maintain a strict control over 
the use of these forms of transportation near operational areas. Walker, and then 
Lea, did not allow combatant troops any closer to 'civilization' than company 
or battalion bases, almost all of which were near the border. And as many of the 
combatants spoke the little-known language of Gurkhali, any one attempting 
journalistic or other investigative work about the border area had to rely on the 
security forces for both information and transportation. Security remained 
excellent all-around. At FARELF headquarters in Singapore, 'need-to-knbw' 
was so strictly adhered to that men working next to each other for months might 
never know what the other was working on.91 It was due primarily to these 
factors that secrecy was maintained. 
As a military tool, CLARET seems to have been most effective between 
June and November 1965 when Lea ordered the intensive series of strikes 
following the attack on Plaman Mapu and the raid on the 18th Milestone Police 
Station. This phase was unlike the previous 11 months of CLARET, when 
Walker used operations as 'rapier-thrusts.' CLARET was most successful when 
the enemy was forced, by a conceited military effort, to defend himself and to 
pull back 10,000 yards or more from the border, whence viable raids simply 
could not be launched. It is noteworthy that every time pressure was eased the 
Indonesians went back on to the offensive, as occurred in October 1965 when 
Lea imposed his 'be kind to Indos' break. 
Many of the campaign's chroniclers have had a tendency to compare 
Confrontation with the war in Vietnam,92 which is understandable for contem-
porary commentators but rather specious for more recent analysts. Although 
there are some striking similarities between the two wars — a long, hard-to-
defend frontier and an internal and external threat, for example—there are some 
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very important differences. For the most part the natives of Borneo wished to 
be part of the federation, as was demonstrated by the UN mission of early 1964; 
indeed, the majority of the security forces' successes would not have been 
possible without the willing assistance of the border tribes. This was not the case 
in South Vietnam where the majority of the rural population felt, at best, 
indifferent to the government, and at worst, openly hostile. The government of 
South Vietnam was unable and unwilling to provide its rural population with real 
protection from the Viet Cong. Fumbling efforts at 'hearts and minds' only 
made matters worse and the war continued to escalate. The leadership of the US-
trained South Vietnamese forces was extremely poor and opportunities to 
destroy the Viet Cong were missed. The British-led security forces in Borneo, 
on the other hand, had excellent leadership and superb soldiery. They were able 
to stop the external threat, while the police and Special Branch handled the 
internal threat. The Americans and South Vietnamese did not seriously attack 
the internal threat until the late 1960s,93 by which time the war had moved into 
a more conventional phase. 
Politically, the secrecy of CLARET allowed the Indonesians a face-
saving way of backing down once military aggression proved fruitless. Militarily, 
CLARET was able to stop the Indonesians. Both tactically and strategically, 
CLARET is an excellent example of 'war as a continuation of policy by other 
means.' It was successful because of strict control by policy-makers and 
because me operations were conducted by highly-trained, physically fit, well-
led, and motivated troops. The Borneo campaign was, according to Denis 
Healey, a "textbook demonstration of how to apply economy of force, under 
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1. J. A.C. Mackie, in Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1974), follows the latter Une of argument, and claims that from 
1964 until the end of Confrontation, there was a "military stalemate." (pp. 2-10,212) This 
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